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Abstract (102 words) 
Tracking the effect of private equity ownership on employment in Japan, we find 
evidence that employment grows significantly under private equity ownership, a 
finding that runs against common expectations and stands in stark contrast with results 
from studies on Anglo-Saxon economies. We further find that the increase is not 
attributable to selection effects and that growth rates during the holding period are 
significantly higher than under the previous ownership. Triangulating these findings 
through interviews with labor, management, and fund ownership, we find implicit 
labor protection through reputational concerns the underlying taming mechanism for 
the observed deviation from expected patterns of employment reduction.  
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Essentially, buyout funds are trading in second-hand businesses where gains entirely 
depend on the difference between the buying and the selling price. With valuation of 
businesses predominantly resulting as multiples of gross profits, any measures 
increasing revenues or cutting costs will positively impact on a fund’s margin. For 
simple accounting reasons, cost-cutting measures come with a much stronger lever as 
cost reductions directly contribute to bottom-line profits. In contrast, an increase in 
revenues only contributes to profits via the gross margin. For instance, in a business 
with high variable cost – say 80% of sales price, a mere 10% reduction of the cost base 
increases profits about as much as a 50% increase in sales. Moreover, increasing sales 
typically requires more time than cost reductions. Accordingly, we may expect buyout 
funds to concentrate on cost reductions whenever possible. 
Eventually, the buyout industry has come in for severe criticism in the media 
for excesses in reducing cost through labor reductions, even more pronounced than 
what has been observed after other forms of ownership change, e.g., through M&A 
activities (Kuvandikov, Pendleton, and Higgins 2014). Buyout investors, suspected of 
increasing profitability at the expense of employees and employment, have been 
labeled “locusts”, “vultures” or “gluttons” (Appelbaum and Batt 2014; Froud and 
Williams 2007; Lutz and Achleitner 2009). While industry associations never tire of 
emphasizing the buyout industry’s social gains in terms of employment preservation 
and creation, most of the independent scholarly research with significant findings on 
the effects on employment of buyout investments documents substantial average losses, 
broadly in line with the almost universally negative public perception of these 
activities.  
For Japan it is particularly difficult to predict the net outcome on employment. 
In a country with a strong tradition of long-term commitments to life-time employment 
(see Kambayashi and Kato 2017), we might expect significantly smaller employment 
losses than in other economies, as such institutional environment may limit the grip of 
investors on one of the major levers in cutting cost. On the other hand, the relative 
absence of economic growth in a country characterized by economic malaise for the 
better part of the past quarter century may also restrict opportunities to increase firm 
value via growth strategies.  
 
Building on a unique proprietary dataset covering the full population of fund-led 
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buyout transactions concluded between the nascence of the Japanese buyout industry 
in 1998 and September 2015, our research finds the first ever evidence of the impact of 
buyout investments on employment levels in Japan. In addition to these descriptive 
accounts, our methodological setup rules out selection effects and also checks on 
causality: do fund managers cause a significant differential in net employment growth? 
Finally, we address the question of whether the employment changes observed are any 
different from general labor market trends and industry-specific developments. This 
question has rarely been addressed in previous studies, mainly due to the adoption of a 
different methodological approach.  
Our analysis yields the following main results. First, we find that Japanese 
businesses subject to buyout transactions by private equity funds exhibit average 
organic growth in standard employment of 12.3% during a median holding period of 
3.92 years and a mean holding period of 4.31 years. Second, when corrected for 
industry effects and labor market trends this figure shifts to 13.4%. Third, fund 
managers investing in Japanese private businesses do not merely buy into existing 
trends, but create a significant and positive employment growth differential pre- and 
post-buyout. And fourth, building on one and two, it becomes obvious that buyout 
fund managers in Japan invest predominantly in industries with negative employment 
growth. 
 
For triangulating these rather surprising results, which indicate no shortage of growth 
opportunities (contrary to common perceptions of the general state of the Japanese 
economy), we conducted a series of interviews with domestic and foreign buyout 
investors. The interviews revealed that fund managers in Japan tend to focus on growth 
strategies and to refrain from affecting the “Holy Grail” of employment as a rational 
response to this particular social norm.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section I reviews related research. Section II 
describes the dataset. Section III presents descriptive results. Section IV explores an 
explanatory model of employment changes and presents a number of robustness 
checks. Section V discusses findings and proposes potential explanations. Section VI 
concludes. 
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I. Related Literature: Findings and Issues 
The studies reviewed here have all documented significant changes in employment 
under private equity ownership when compared to pre-buyout employment levels 
and/or control groups. i Studies sponsored by industry associations and labor 
organizations and research not verified in peer-review processes were excluded due to 
the possibility of vested interests and for quality concerns, respectively. We review 
them in relation to our four research questions: (1) What is the impact of buyout 
investments on employment? (2) Has the study identified or ruled out selection effects? 
(3) Does the study tackle the question of causality? (4) How does the sample compare 
to the overall population? 
Liebeskind et al. (1992) analyze 33 buyouts that occurred in the largest 1,500 
US corporations between 1980 and 1984. Post buyout, the median number of 
employees declined in both buyout targets and matched control firms, but significantly 
more in the former. The authors control for pre-buyout differences, which rules out 
selection effects. They further find that buyout managers downsized corporate 
operations significantly more than in their set of publicly listed control firms, 
evidencing a causal involvement of funds. They do not, however, address the question 
of how the buyout sample compares to industry-specific labor market trends. 
Harris et al. (2005) report massive job losses after analyzing a large sample of 
979 buyouts and 4,877 manufacturing plants in the UK during the years 1994–1998. 
By comparing the mean value of post-buyout to pre-buyout employment levels, they 
find a staggering 61% (weighted) job loss at manufacturing plants. The authors report 
that funds are investing in plants with below average productivity pointing to a 
selection effect. However, as in the study of Liebeskind et al. (1992), the question of 
how the buyout sample compares to the overall economy in terms of employment 
changes is not addressed. 
Boucly et al. (2011) examine an almost equally large sample of 839 buyouts in 
France completed between 1994 and 2004. They find that between the four years 
preceding the transaction and the four subsequent years, employment growth at buyout 
targets is significantly higher than at their control firms (cumulative 18%), and in the 
four years after buyout employment grows by approximately 15%. The magnitude of 
cumulative employment growth is comparable to our findings and there is indicative 
evidence of some qualitative similarities. While the authors do not comment on it 
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explicitly, their Figure 3 suggests that there may be a selection effect, as fund 
managers seem to prefer investing in businesses with larger employment growth than 
matched controls. Post-buyout employment growth remains significantly higher even 
after controlling for pre-buyout differences, indicating that fund managers do make a 
difference. Their study does not, however, include a comparison between employment 
developments in their sample and industry-specific employment trends in French 
businesses. 
Cressy et al. (2011) analyze 57 buyouts in the UK over the period 1995–2000. 
Employment at investee companies falls by 7% relative to controls (83 firms) as early 
as the first year post buyout, peaking at a 23% per annum loss in the fourth year. 
Finding a significant difference post buyout compared to their matched companies, but 
no such difference in the buyout year itself, the authors argue that there was no 
selection effect and that fund managers did have a significant impact on employment 
levels at sample firms. A comparison of employment changes in the sample and the 
overall labor market is missing. 
Goergen et al. (2011) study 73 buyouts of UK public companies completed in 
the years 2000–2006 and find that employment in acquired firms reduces significantly 
in the year immediately after the completion of the transaction compared to the 
matched sample of non-acquired firms. Selection effects can be ruled out because they 
find no significant differences in medians between sample companies and control 
companies pre-buyout, and fund managers’ impact on employment levels post buyout 
seems significant. A comparison of employment changes in the sample and industry-
specific labor market trends is also missing. 
Davis et al. (2014) track employment at 3,200 firms and their 150,000 
establishments in the US that were subject to buyouts between 1980 and 2005. At the 
establishment level, employment shrinks by 3% relative to controls in the two-year 
period post buyout and by 6% over five years. Gross job loss at target establishments 
outpaces the losses at controls by a cumulative 10 percentage points over five years 
post buyout. At firm level, target firms create new jobs in newly opened establishments 
at a faster pace than control firms. However, accounting for the purchase and sale of 
establishments as well, the target–control growth differential is less than 1% of initial 
employment over two years. Therefore, the authors conclude that buyouts lead to 
modest net job losses, but large increases in gross job creation and abolition. They rule 
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out selection effects by controlling for pre-buyout growth history and find post-buyout 
employment growth rates at target firms significantly different from controls. As in 
other studies relying on a matched-pairs approach, it remains unclear how investee 
companies compare to general labor market trends.  
Finally, Bernstein et al. (2016) analyzed 11,735 country-industry-year 
observations between 1986 and 2009 in a global study. Employment in buyout 
industries (i.e., industries where private equity funds invest) grows significantly faster 
than in non-buyout industries. This result seems at least partly driven by spillover 
effects from buyout target firms to other firms in the industry. Bernstein et al. rule out 
a selection effect because buyout funds do not seem to select industries that are 
growing faster. They include country-industry and industry-year fixed effects to 
measure the impact of buyout investments relative to the average performance in a 
given country, industry, and year, but equally do not indicate how their sample 
compares to the overall economy.  
 
Summing up this review of prior research, cost efficiency measures – including 
reductions in headcount – seem to balance or even outweigh growth strategies in the 
vast majority of cases. Beyond these material findings, the studies reviewed identify a 
number of methodological challenges in estimating the impact of buyout investments 
on employment (see for example Davis et al. 2014). Firstly, reliability of studies is at 
risk through measurement errors, namely through (a) an unwarranted inclusion of cases 
with acquisitions or divestments of business units during the holding period, or through 
(b) definitional issues such as using gross headcount instead of full-time equivalent, 
which leaves changes in employment practices unaccounted for (for example, 
increasing share of part-time work). Secondly, there is substantial risk of biased 
samples, namely through (a) the dropping of buyouts that involve the sale or 
acquisition of business units (in an attempt at avoiding measurements errors), and (b) 
when samples are drawn from unknown populations that cannot be checked for 
representativeness. 
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II. Population and Sample 
Our proprietary dataset, assembled and cross-evaluated using government reports, fund 
websites, press searches and data provided by an independent Japanese advisor, 
includes the population of n=404 majority buyout transactions of private businesses 
with operations in Japan conducted since 1998 and exited by September 2015. 
Employment figures for 224 investee companies were obtained from Teikoku 
Databank. Funds themselves were also asked to provide employment figures on their 
investee companies. In order to avoid “cherry picking”, we made full data disclosure 
(i.e., for the entire completed part of their portfolios) a prerequisite for participation. 
Eventually, seven funds provided data on 77 exited portfolio companies. With data on 
45 companies received from both sources, size of the raw sample was n=256.  
For addressing the risks to reliability discussed in section I, we checked all 
transactions in the sample for acquisitions and divestments of business units during the 
holding period and 17 corresponding cases (or 6.64% of the raw sample) were 
identified. In light of this relatively low figure, we decided to trade in a good deal of 
reliability for a small – if any – loss in validity by eliminating these distorted cases. As 
full time equivalents were not available we opted for headcount of regular full-time 
employees. Given the strong general trend towards more non-standard employment 
observed for Japan since the 1990s (Blind and Lottanti von Mandach 2015), headcount 
of regular employees can be considered a strongly conservative measure of total 
employment.  
To match employment data to the entry and exit dates, a maximum deviation of 
365 days was allowed. As the effective date for most employment adjustments in Japan 
is April 1, cases with post-entry data beyond March 31 were not included reducing the 
raw sample to 239 cases (204 firms covered by Teikoku Databank, 66 by fund 
manager data, and 31 by both sources). 
In the next step we used 62 valid pairs of firm/year observations received from 
both sources to test for a potential reporting bias by fund managers. As neither one- nor 
two-sided tests could confirm a statistically significant difference, the data obtained 
from fund managers was integrated. ii  This test, however, does not preclude the 
possibility of self-selection among participating funds (see discussion of robustness in 
section 5). Employment levels at entry and exit were approximated by linear 
interpolation and extrapolation respectively. Appended TABLE A documents properties 
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of data matching and corresponding inter/extrapolation. Notably, the difference in the 
mean correction factors of employment at entry and exit contributes 1.68 percentage 
points to a conservative estimate of employment growth under fund ownership. Finally, 
the following were also excluded: 35 cases with insufficient employment data on either 
entry or exit; 7 cases with less than 10 regular employees at time of investment; and 13 
cases with holding periods of up to one year.iii The final sample therefore contains 
n=184 cases (or 45.5% of the population).  
As our dataset covers the full population, we are able to assess the sample and 
its subsets for representativeness. Eventually, we found the sample well-balanced with 
regard to an important number of dimensions such as its distribution over time 
(appended TABLE B), the size of investee companies and duration of holding period 
(appended TABLE C), as well as sample composition by deal type, fund category, and 
industries (appended TABLE D and E).  
III. Descriptive Results 
We use an industry-adjustment approach as used by Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990) or 
Sousa and Jenkinson (2013) in the buyout industry context, and by Allen and Philipps 
(2000) or Hsu et al. (2015) in other empirical studies. We also analyze whether the 
observed employment changes are any different from general labor market trends and 
industry-specific developments, because we believe that such information is critical for 
policy making. This question has rarely been addressed in previous studies mainly due 
to the adoption of a different methodological approach such as matched-pairs analysis, 
which is more appropriate in studies directed towards understanding mechanisms of 
change in firms (see for example Liebeskind et al. 1993 and O’Farrell and Hitchens 
1988). It remains largely unclear whether fund managers select businesses with above- 
or below-average employment growth as compared to the overall economy. 
Addressing these latter questions, we equally succeed in providing evidence on the 
same questions as addressed by matched-pairs studies, including employment levels, 
selection effects and causality. 
 
A direct comparison of standard (regular) employment at entry and exit of fund 
investors provides cues to our first question on employment changes during fund 
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ownership. There was an average increase of 12.3% in standard employment during 
the holding period with a one-sided confidence threshold of 7.99% at the 90% level 
(CI90% = [6.78; 17.75]). Using only the data from Teikoku Databank (n=137) reduces 
these figures to 10.44% with a 90% threshold of 5.61%. This shows that the private 
equity industry is making an overall positive contribution to employment growth in 
Japan, which is in stark contrast to most findings from other countries. Owing to the 
dispersion of holding periods, however, the measure of total growth during holding 
period is subject to quite substantial variance, which unnecessarily complicates further 
statistical treatment.  
Therefore, we use compound annual growth rates as our test statistic going 
forward. TABLE 1 shows the test statistic for the entire sample as well as for subsets 
‘Teikoku’ (data obtained from Teikoku Databank) and ‘Fund’ (data obtained from 
fund managers). Businesses under fund ownership show a positive trend in regular 
employment with significant estimates confirmed at the 90% level in one-sided t-tests 
for the full sample as well as for both subsets. Mean growth rates are substantially 
higher for subset ‘Fund’, which may indicate a self-selection bias (likelihood of fund 
participation in our survey potentially conditional upon their track record of 
employment creation). We will revert to this issue in the robustness part of the 
discussion (see section IV). 
 
TABLE 1: COMPOUND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (CAGR) OF REGULAR EMPLOYMENT 
UNDER FUND OWNERSHIP (%) 
  Confidence (90%)   
 Mean lower       upper one-sided Min Max 
0.56 2.70 0.79 –22.13 36.80 Full sample 
(n=184) 
1.63 
(0.0065)      
–0.06 2.29 0.20 –22.13 28.36 Subset ‘Teikoku’ 
(n=137) 
1.12 
(0.0072)      
0.74 5.49 1.26 –16.98 36.80 Subset ‘Fund’ 
(n=47) 
3.11 
(0.0144)      
 
The second question – whether these changes are any different from general labor 
market trends and industry-specific developments – is addressed by adjusting the data 
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for corresponding changes documented in the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare’s 
Labor Force Survey (Rôdôryoku Chôsa) (Statistics Bureau of Japan 1998–2015). This 
adjustment is achieved by expanding the employment figures by the inverse of the 
relative change in industry-specific absolute employment figures during the holding 
period. The Labor Force Survey provides monthly data from 2002, enabling almost 
perfect matching of entry and exit dates. Before 2002, where only annual data is 
available, weighted averages are used.  
Re-computing the test statistic using the adjusted employment figures produces 
qualitatively similar distributional properties with increased significance (see TABLE 2). 
One-sided tests are now significant at the 95% level for the full sample as well as for 
both subsets. Employment creation during fund ownership is therefore not attributable 
to general labor market trends and industry-specific developments. 
 
 
TABLE 2: COMPOUND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (CAGR) OF REGULAR EMPLOYMENT UNDER 
FUND OWNERSHIP CORRECTED FOR INDUSTRY EFFECTS AND LABOR MARKET TRENDS (%) 
Notes: Subset ‘Teikoku’ includes cases exclusively involving data from Teikoku Databank;  
subset ‘Fund’ includes all cases involving data obtained from funds. 
 
A comparison of means of the full samples in TABLE 1 and TABLE 2 shows that the 
funds in our sample have invested in an industry mix of businesses with negative 
average employment growth. When applied to the entire holding period, the relative 
difference between employment figures before and after these adjustments becomes 
significantly different from zero (mean = 1.82pp, CI90% = [0.63; 3.01]). Thus, 
investments in industries with negative average employment growth can safely be 
claimed to extend to the population of buyout investments in Japan.  
While these findings suggest that industry growth trends do not guide the 
general investment strategy of fund management, it is still possible that relative growth 
  Confidence (95%)   
 Mean lower    upper one-sided Min Max 
0.48 3.07 0.69 –21.50 36.54 Full sample 
(n=184) 
1.77 
(0.0066)      
0.02 2.92 0.26 –21.50 25.49 Subset ‘Teikoku’ 
(n=137) 
1.47 
(0.0074)      
Subset ‘Fund’ 
(n=47) 
2.65 
(0.0144) 
–0.16 5.47 0.29 –16.12 36.54 
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potential is a selection criterion within industries. Consequently, a pre-/post-entry 
comparison of growth rates for the individual companies in the sample is required to 
answer our third question – whether funds are buying or creating employment growth. 
TABLE 3 lists three differentials of employment growth after minus before funds 
invested into the businesses.  Subset A contrasts growth during the first year (365 days) 
past investment to the last year  prior to investment. Subset B shifts focus to the second 
year under fund management, and subset C excludes cases involving data obtained 
from fund management.  
TABLE 3: DIFFERENTIALS OF PRE-/POST-ENTRY EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AFTER 
ADJUSTMENTS (PP) 
Reference periodyear n Mean Confidence (90%) Min Max 
(subset) (∈‘Funds’)  lower upper one-sided   
Entry1 – Entry-1  
(A) 
81 
(7) 
–0.64 
(0.0262) 
–4.95 3.68 –3.99 –112.1 50.9 
Entry2 – Entry-1  
(B) 
65 
(7) 
5.66 
(0.0291) 
0.87 10.44 1.93 –74.7 78.7 
Entry2 – Entry-1  
(C) 
58 
(0) 
4.68 
(0.0312) 
–0.45 9.81 0.68 –74.7 78.7 
Notes:  Composition of subsets A and B result from data availability;  
subset C corresponds to subset B less the cases involving data obtained from fund management. 
 
Results indicate no significant change in employment growth during the first year of 
ownership (subset A), for which we cannot confirm a significant growth differential. 
This supports our earlier decision to exclude transactions with holding periods of up to 
one year. Results become more clear-cut when the second year of fund ownership is 
compared to the 12 months preceding entry. Here, a two-sided test is significant at the 
90% level (subset B). Even after excluding the seven cases involving data from the 
Funds (subset C), we still find a one-sided test significant at the 90% level (at 0.68pp).  
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IV. Understanding Employment Change 
Given the median holding period of 3.92 years, it is unsurprising that earlier growth 
(12 months prior to investment) is only weakly correlated (0.162) to compound annual 
employment growth under fund management. Correspondingly, a univariate regression 
with 106 degrees of freedom yields an R2 of only 0.026 with a parameter estimate of 
0.067 significant at the 90% level. With “acquired growth” only a minor influence, the 
data available from our set of micro data is used to further explore potential 
influencing factors.  
As has become obvious from our comparison of pre-/post-entry employment 
growth, strategies aimed at boosting sales require time to play out in terms of 
employment.  Adding to this initial time lag, standard economic theory also assumes 
that marginal effects of ownership/strategy chance are decreasing over time. Taken 
together we expect smaller average growth in deals with very short as well as with 
very long holding periods relative to deals with medium-length holding periods. We 
capture this compound non-linear relationship in a categorical variable that regroups 
all sample cases by the time the corresponding businesses ultimately were subject to 
fund management, i.e., by their holding period (rounded to years; base category 1, 
2, …, 6 and 7+ years).  
Although the dependent variable is corrected for general industry effects, the 
ability of funds to select growth potential may vary by industry. As the vast majority of 
fund managers hail from the financial sector, they may be at a relative advantage when 
it comes to making judgments about businesses in the financial sector. Accordingly, a 
‘Finance and Insurance’ dummy is included. 
Further controls are added for size (growth opportunities expected to be 
marginally decreasing), year fixed effects (owing to the time series nature of the 
dataset), as well as dummies for “turnaround” deals (with more substantial job losses 
expected), fund type (keiretsu-type funds as base category versus non-keiretsu and 
foreign funds; with employment protection assumed to be strongest within keiretsu 
firms and of the least importance to foreign funds). Importantly, a corresponding 
dummy also controls for deals involving data obtained from funds, in order to test for 
potential selection bias. TABLE 4 documents estimation output. 
 
13 
 
 
TABLE 4: ESTIMATION OUTPUT FOR COMPOUND ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
CORRECTED FOR GENERAL INDUSTRY AND LABOR MARKET TRENDS 
Variable Estimate t 
(Intercept)        –0.0082 –0.191 
HPr2             0.0600   * 1.846 
HPr3              0.0686    ** 2.348 
HPr4              0.0817 *** 2.713 
HPr5              0.0939  *** 2.887 
HPr6              0.0747 ** 2.151 
HPr7+          0.0562    * 1.767 
Sector finance    0.0757    ** 2.388 
log(Stafft=0)       –0.0162    *** –2.937 
FE2001           –0.0050 –0.129 
FE2002            0.0310 0.807 
FE2003            0.0416    1.254 
FE2004            0.0681 ** 2.125 
FE2005           –0.0020 –0.059 
FE2006            0.0354 1.091 
FE2007            0.0528    1.593 
FE2008            0.0482 1.389 
FE2009            0.0255 0.680 
FE2010            0.0461 1.283 
FE2011            0.0867 ** 2.150 
Turnaround       –0.0242    –1.255 
Foreign fund –0.0060 –0.295 
Non-keiretsu     –0.0021 –0.131 
Fund data (dummy)  0.0293 * 1.729 
Notes: n=184, multiple R2:  0.1906, adjusted R2:  0.0720, F-statistic: 1.607 on 157 DF,  p-value: 0.0480 
 
The overall model is significant at the 95% level. In spite of several categorical 
variables transformed into dummies, individual variance inflation factors are all well 
below 4 (the most conservative of the frequently suggested thresholds of 10, 5 and 4). 
Residual analytics (residuals vs. fitted, residuals vs. leverage, normal q-q, scale 
location and heteroscedasticity) did not indicate any major concerns. Three cases of 
potential outliers were re-examined, but no measurement errors were found.  
The dummy-coded categorical variable capturing the non-linear relationship 
between length of holding period and employment growth produced significant 
estimates for the entire spectrum (HPr2 to HPr7+). More importantly, parameter 
estimates reproduce the hypothesized inverse U-shaped relationship: short-term fund 
involvement causes less employment growth than mid-term investments, and long-
term holding periods show a depletion of improvement opportunities. Equally, 
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familiarity of fund managers with their own industry helps to tap a significant positive 
growth differential of 7.57pp for investee companies from the financial sector. Size 
equally proved to be relevant control, with an estimated negative differential of 1.62pp 
for every tenfold increase in size of investee companies. As regards year fixed effects, 
years 2004 and 2011 produce significant parameter estimates at the 95% level and 
years 2007 and 2008 are not very far off a significant estimate (pre-2001 and post-2011 
cases were relegated to the base category to keep variance inflation at a reasonable 
level, each with <7 cases; see appended Table A). These findings suggest that most 
deals concluded in 2004 and 2011 benefited disproportionately from phases of general 
economic recovery (until 2008, chiefly under Prime Minister Koizumi, and until 2015 
under Prime Minister Abe respectively). In turn, financing committed for years ahead 
may have helped a substantial number of deals concluded in 2007 and 2008 to fare 
significantly above the industry average considering the challenges faced in the post-
Lehman shock years. Among the remaining controls, turnaround and fund types loaded 
with the expected signs, but did not produce significant estimates. In contrast, cases 
involving data provided by fund management were obviously subject to a self-
selection bias with a positive premium of 2.93pp significant at the 90% level.  
Robustness of Descriptive Results 
In view of the selection bias identified above, our earlier evidence needs to be 
reconfirmed based on sample subsets not involving data provided by funds. 
Accordingly, we assess the composition of subset ‘Teikoku’ and subset ‘C’ as used for 
evidencing our second and third research questions (Tables 2 and 3) against the 
population. We do so by using the variables identified as significant in our explanatory 
model (Table 4) for estimating the baseline impact on subset means. Appended Table F 
provides the corresponding estimates. As it turns out, the estimated impact on sample 
means does not challenge our initial finding of positive employment growth in 
businesses under fund management.iv Neither does it challenge findings on our second 
question – whether the growth identified is any different from general labor market 
trends.v Equally, subset C providing evidence on our third question – whether funds are 
buying or creating employment growth – still holds. 
While these checks thus raise no technical concerns with our findings, the most 
substantial corroboration of robustness is the strongly conservative measure of 
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employment used. In fact, between 1998 and 2015, the number of non-regular 
employees in Japan increased from 11.76 million to 19.79 million (headcount; +61%). 
During this period, on average 72% of the non-regular employees were part-time 
employees and temporary workers (arubaito), 16% were contract employees and 5% 
worked for temporary labor agencies. Contract and agency workers usually work full 
time with a limited time contract, while part-time workers and temporary workers 
(arubaito) work an average of 26.5 hours per week, 66% of a full-time equivalent 
(FTE) (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 2011). Thus, in 1998, non-regular 
workers amounted to 8.59 million FTE and in 2015 to 14.45 million. This corresponds 
to a CAGR of 3.35% of non-regular employees in addition to our finding of a mean of 
1.77 CAGR for regular employment under fund ownership (see Table 2), making total 
job creation under private equity ownership well above 4% p.a. 
V. Discussion 
Our analysis provides substantial evidence on all four research questions (organic 
employment growth, selection effects, causality, and comparison to the overall 
economy. With regard to the first question, we identify a number of variables linked to 
employment growth in businesses under fund ownership: holding period (in a non-
linear fashion); familiarity of the fund manager with the industry of the investee 
company; and size and timing of investments (vintage years 2004 and 2011).  
 
The most important difference between the present results for Japan and earlier 
research on other economies is the finding of significant positive effects on 
employment growth. The one and only research reporting employment growth of 
similar magnitude is the study by Boucly et al. (2011) analyzing buyout investments in 
France. They report that employment grows by a cumulative 18% between the four 
years preceding the transaction and the four subsequent years, and by approximately 
15% in the four years after buyout. Post-buyout employment growth is, however, 
concentrated among private-to-private transactions, where sellers typically are 
individuals or the founding families, as opposed to divisional buyouts, secondary 
buyouts, and public-to-private buyouts. The authors take this as first evidence that 
private equity funds may alleviate credit constraints for medium-sized private 
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companies, allowing investee companies to tap into pre-existing growth opportunities.  
To test their hypothesis on our data, we re-run our analysis introducing 
dummies equivalent to the panels in Boucly et al. (2011). Here we find indications of a 
similar hierarchical structure, in which “take-private”-type transactions show the 
lowest gains in employment growth followed by divestments. The most substantial 
gains are made in private-to-private transactions, including secondary buyouts. Alas, 
parameter estimates for the corresponding dummy variables are not significant. Thus, 
Boucly et al.’s (2011) controls may also be relevant for an interpretation of our results. 
They cannot, however, explain the order-of-magnitude difference to findings from 
Anglo-Saxon economies.  
 
To further put our findings into perspective, we next consider differences in the 
institutional environment, particularly the regulatory environment. In the literature, 
Japanese labor law, as interpreted by the courts, has been regarded not only as 
employee-friendly, but as effectively preventing any cutting of regular employment in 
situations other than near-bankruptcy (Araki 2005; Witt 2014). Thus, as a first 
conjecture, compliance with the regulatory framework may significantly reduce the 
negative part of the distribution of employment change. 
A second conjecture builds on Guiso et al.s’ (2006) assumption that social 
norms are closely linked to preferences, which may lead to biased market decisions. 
There is an abundance of literature about variations in preferences across different 
institutional environments in general, and Japan-specific preferences in particular (see 
for example Katzner 2008). For instance, Japanese corporate culture has been likened 
to the ideal of a “company family” (Bhappu 2000). Companies are expected to act 
“benevolently” towards their employees and to secure their employment, while for 
their part employees commit themselves to the company (Glisby and Holden 2003; 
Hill 1995; Hofstede and Bond 1988;). What has since reached the status of a social 
norm by the 1980s builds on a history of labor struggle for the “protection of 
livelihood” in the early post-war period (Kishimoto 1968) and significant and lasting 
concessions from management in terms of employment stability the 1960s and 1970s 
(Hashimoto 1991). Thus, given the strong foothold of the social norm of employment 
protection in Japanese society, selling parties might be reluctant to “throw their 
employees to the vultures” and may eventually not sell their business to the highest 
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bidder, but to the buyer most likely to conform to the social norm of valuing 
employment. Our second conjecture, thus, understands fund managers as reacting to 
such preferences when adopting growth strategies in an attempt at reputation building. 
Third, growth strategies might be relatively more profitable in Japan than 
elsewhere owing to differences in restructuring cost given the risks and costs 
associated with layoffs, which include a negative impact on staff morale and 
reputational damage arising from such disrespect of the social norm of employment 
protection.  
To assess the extent to which these three conjectures explain the results of our 
study (13.4% organic employment growth after correcting for industry effects and 
labor market trends), we conducted a series of 30 interviews with management, fund 
ownership and unions in July 2014 and January 2015. Among the unions interviewed 
there were two industrial unions and two company unions, one of which had been 
founded as a reaction to the ownership change to a private equity investor. First, all 
interviewees agreed that legal constraints are not a major reason for avoiding job cuts 
as legislation and its application were less strict than usually portrayed (contradicting 
conjecture 1). Second, to lay off regular employees in order to maximize profits is not 
socially acceptable. This finding is consistent with conjecture 2. Third, concerns about 
their reputation cause fund managers to implement strategies leading to employment 
growth rather than cost-cutting measures. This taming mechanism is effective as well 
for Anglo-Saxon international investors active in Japan, which confirms that firm 
behavior may indeed depend on “sets of interlocking institutional arrangements within 
national economies” (Appelbaum et al. 2013:515).  
There are several reasons for this latter aspect. Job cuts may have a highly 
negative impact on staff morale in the investee company owing to the few exit options 
available in the rigidly structured Japanese labor market. Similarly, layoffs impact 
negatively on the image of an investee company, which may translate into a substantial 
threat to sales growth. Furthermore, and likely most importantly, to be seen not to care 
about employees of an acquired company will substantially increase the cost of 
winning future deals for fund managers. Especially in the case of business successions, 
owners tend to care about the future of their company and employees, and therefore 
may even request a legally binding agreement not to lay off employees for two to three 
years after buyout (evidence for conjecture 2). Also, given the importance attached to 
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the banking system in Japan, financial advisors and commercial banks play a pivotal 
role in the sourcing of deals. As large layoffs would reflect badly not only on the fund 
manager, but also on the intermediary, fund managers have an incentive to refrain from 
layoffs in order not to jeopardize their future deal-sourcing capabilities. Besides the 
concerns of intermediaries pertaining to their own reputation, baseline profits of main 
banks directly depend on keeping and growing the investee company as their 
borrowers (evidence for conjecture 3). 
To sum up, the social norm of employment protection has pervaded the 
strategizing of selling and acquiring investors to a most considerable degree. This is 
evident from the fact that investors in our sample concentrate on growth strategies 
even in the absence of labor representation. Thus, investor behavior qualifies as 
rational response to a social norm and their voluntary limitation to investee companies 
with little if any need for restructuring may partly explain the positive growth rates 
achieved during the holding period (appended Figure A indicates that there were 
hardly any cases with employment reductions beyond what can be achieved via 
fluctuation). For fund managers, sellers with continued business operations, and 
intermediaries alike these findings are consistent with profit maximizing motives as 
moderation in employment reductions pays off in terms of reputational gains and cost 
reductions (conjecture 3). In contrast, selling business owners as “carriers” of such 
social norm are unlikely to reap any future financial benefit from selecting buyers by 
their (moderate) stance on employment reduction. This indicates that their behavior 
might be guided by social preferences (conjecture 2). 
 
Our interviews revealed two further cues to understanding the “growth blessings 
brought by vultures” in Japan. First, consistent with the finding that size is negatively 
related to employment growth (see TABLE 9), fund managers report that there is often 
little need to reduce employment. This is because the majority of deals are small to 
medium-sized companies (median number of employees at entry: 200), which not only 
tend to have less slack (owing to continuous margin pressure in vertical keiretsu 
groups), but also come with more ample potential for scale effects. However, even a 
tenfold increase in company size would reduce employment CAGR by a mere 1.62 pp 
(see TABLE 9), and thus only explains a minor fraction of the difference in growth 
between our findings and the figures reported for most Anglo-Saxon economies.  
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Second, specific to the case of corporate divestments, the parent company often 
adjusts employment within the group prior to the transfer of ownership. Doing so 
potentially increases the sales price by the equivalent of the restructuring costs avoided, 
including reputational risk incurred by sellers and acquirers.  
 
Our fourth finding, of funds investing in an industry-mix with negative average 
employment growth, is consistent with their business logic as traders in second-hand 
businesses. With prices predominantly determined as multiples of gross profits, 
effecting the same absolute profit improvement to a poorly profitable business rather 
than to a well-performing business translates into a much larger gain for the investing 
fund. For example, increasing profits from 2 to 4% percent may well suffice to double 
value, whereas boosting profits from 10 to 12% will lead to a value gain of just about 
20%.   
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This study provides novel evidence on four central issues. First, our descriptive 
analysis of Japanese businesses subject to a buyout transaction between 1998 and 2015 
finds average organic growth in standard employment of 12.3% during holding period 
of (median: 3.92 years, mean: 4.31 years). Second, when corrected for industry-
specific labor market trends, growth amounts to 13.4%. Furthermore, given the 
massive increase in non-standard employment during the period studied (+61% 
between 1998 and 2015), our estimate of employment under private equity ownership 
is highly conservative. Third, the study documents that fund managers investing in 
Japanese private businesses do not merely buy into existing trends, but cause change 
by creating a positive differential between pre- and post-buyout employment growth. 
Fourth, buyout funds in Japan bring about this substantial growth in industries with 
average negative employment growth, a finding consistent with theoretical predictions. 
Our explanatory model identifies a number of variables with significant links to 
employment growth: duration of holding period; familiarity of the fund manager with 
the industry; size of the investee company; and vintage years 2004 and 2011. However, 
neither of these factors can explain why employment growth in Japan under fund 
ownership is so much higher than in other developed economies.  
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Whereas evidence from our series of interviews indicates that the regulatory 
framework does not effectively prevent job cuts, reputation was found to be relevant as 
a reflection on the widely accepted social norm of employment protection. This taming 
mechanism is especially relevant in the case of business successions where it ties in 
with anecdotal evidence on deals not awarded to the highest bidder. Fund managers 
who cut costs through employment reductions are risking access to future deals. 
Consequently, all parties involved have a strategic interest in growing employment – 
or at least, in avoiding layoffs. This supports our third conjecture on strategic behavior 
in fund managers: dominant growth strategies are arguably a reflection, less of 
preferences than of strategic motivation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
FIGURE A: CAGR OF REGULAR EMPLOYMENT DURING HOLDING PERIOD BY ENTRY 
YEAR 
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TABLE A: PROPERTIES OF DATA MATCHING AND INTER-/EXTRAPOLATION IN SAMPLE 
  Mean SD SD (months) 
Min Max 
Matching  Entry –10.9 132 4.39 –358 323 
(days) Exit –25.9 116 3.87 –354 237 
       
Inter-/extrapolation Entry   0.83 7.54  –33.4 47.3 
(per cent) Exit –0.85 5.56  –61.8 15.3 
TABLE B: SAMPLE COVERAGE OF POPULATION BY VINTAGE YEAR (YEAR OF ENTRY) 
Sample coverage (n)  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Full sample (184)  0.50 0.40 0.48 0.34 0.40 0.40 0.57 0.45 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ (137)  0.13 0.27 0.19 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.38 0.32 
Subset ‘C’ (58)  0.13 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.13 
 
Sample coverage (contd) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Full sample 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.58 0.85 0.13 0.50 0.46 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.54 0.85 0.13 0.40 0.34 
Subset ‘C’ 0.16 0.28 0.04 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.14 
TABLE C: DISTRIBUTION OF DEAL SIZE AND HOLDING PERIOD  
 N Mean(log) SD(log) Median Min Max 
Deal size (billion yen)       
Population 356 1.59 0.68 3.86 0.10 415 
Sample 166 1.62 0.66 4.53 0.12 352 
   Subset ‘Teikoku’ 119 1.66 0.68 4.58 0.12 352 
   Subset ‘C’ 52 1.65 0.70 4.45 0.12 352 
       
Holding period (months)       
Population (HP > 12 months) 383 1.64 0.230 43.4 13.0 224.0 
Sample 184 1.66 0.228 45.4 13.0 144.0 
   Subset ‘Teikoku’ 137 1.68 0.231 47.7 13.0 144.0 
   Subset ‘C’ 58 1.78 0.169 59.9 25 144.0 
Notes: Median calculated as 10^mean(log). 
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TABLE D: COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE AND POPULATION BY  
TYPE OF FUND AND TYPE OF TRANSACTION AND EXIT 
 
Dimension 
 
Category 
Population  
(n=404) 
Sample  
(n=184) 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ 
(n=137) 
Subset ‘C’  
(n=58) 
Fund type Dependent (J) 0.51 0.55 0.47 0.41 
 Independent (J) 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.34 
 Foreign 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.24 
      
Deal type Divestment 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.33 
 Turnaround 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.17 
 MBO 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.24 
 PIPE TP* 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.14 
 Business succession 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.05 
 Secondary buyout 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 
 NA 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 
*Private Investments into Public Equity (PIPE) occur when a buyout firm acquires stocks of a publicly traded 
company. If the acquired company is subsequently delisted, the transaction is referred to as “take private” (TP). 
TABLE E: COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE AND POPULATION BY INDUSTRY (%) 
 
Industry 
Population  
(n=404) 
Sample  
(n=184) 
Subset ‘Teikoku’ 
(n=137) 
Subset ‘C’ 
(n=58) 
Bio/Health Care/Medical   5.20   6.52 5.84 8.62 
Construction   2.97   3.26 4.38 0.00 
Consumer Goods and Other Products 10.15 10.33 8.76 13.8 
Electronics/Machinery/Automobile 15.10 20.11 24.1 22.4 
Finance/Insurance   5.69   4.89 5.11 3.45 
Food/Agriculture   7.67 10.87 9.49 8.62 
IT/Telecom/Internet   7.18   5.98 5.84 3.45 
Material/Chemical/Metal/Mining   6.19   5.43 5.84 5.17 
Media/Publishing/Contents    5.45   4.35 3.65 1.72 
Restaurant   3.71   4.35 3.65 1.72 
Retail/Wholesale 10.64   7.61 7.30 8.62 
Service 16.09 14.67 13.1 17.2 
Transportation/Distribution   3.96   1.63 1.46 1.72 
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TABLE F: POPULATION AND SAMPLE SUBSET COMPOSITION  
AND ESTIMATED BASELINE IMPACT 
  Subset ‘Teikoku’ (n=137) Subset ‘C’ (n=58) 
Dimension Category 
 
Population† 
(%) 
Structure 
(%) 
Impact 
(pp) 
 Structure 
(%) 
Impact  
(pp) 
2 17.49 13.14 –0.26   1.72 –0.95 
3 21.93 22.63  0.05 17.24 –0.32 
Holding period 
(years) 
4 18.02 17.52 –0.04 25.86  0.64 
 5 13.58 14.60  0.10 17.24  0.34 
 6   7.57   7.30 –0.02 12.07  0.34 
 7p 15.67 18.98  0.19 25.86  0.57 
Industry Finance/ 
insurance 
5.69 5.11 –0.04   3.45 –0.17 
Vintage 2004 13.12 11.68 –0.10 10.34 –0.19 
 2011   3.22   8.03  0.42   5.17  0.17 
Deal size 
(mean(log(value)))†† 
  1.59   1.62 –0.05   1.65 –0.10 
Sum of estimated impact   0.23   0.34 
Notes:   
Subset ‘Teikoku’ as used in Table 2, subset ‘C’ as used in Table 3. Impact estimated as product of 
structural differentials and parameter estimates of Table 4. 
†   n = 383 for holding period >12 months, n = 404 for Industry and Vintage, n = 355 for Deal size 
†† nTeikoku = 119, nC = 52     
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i  The following studies report non-significant employment effects of buyout investments: Kaplan 
(1989), examining 48 buyouts of public companies; Smith (1990), considering 58 buyouts of public 
companies in the US completed between 1977 and 1986; Bruining et al. (2005), conducting 
questionnaire-based surveys in the UK (145 buyouts between 1994 and 1997) and the Netherlands 
(45 buyouts between 1992 and 1998); Amess and Wright (2007), analyzing 1,350 buyouts in the UK 
executed between 1994 and 1998; Amess and Wright (2012), researching 544 buyouts in the UK 
between 1993 and 2004; and Amess, Girma, and Wright (2014), studying 232 buyouts in the UK 
between 1996 and 2006. Bacon, Wright, and Demina (2004) conducted a questionnaire survey 
among buyouts and buy-ins the UK with a transaction value of at least £5 million that had been 
completed in the period 1994–7. Out of 145 firms, 60% indicated that the total number of employees 
increased compared with pre-buyout, 19% that employment stayed the same and 12% that it 
decreased. 
ii  This test, however, does not preclude the possibility of self-selection among participating funds (see 
discussion of robustness in section 5). 
iii  See also sections IV and V. Deals with holding periods < 1 year known as “flip-deals”. Buyout funds 
merely act as business brokers aiming to identify a strategic buyer for the acquired business, but do 
not systematically engage in restructuring efforts.  
iv  The one-sided 90% threshold for total employment growth during the holding period figures a 
magnitude higher at 7.99pp. 
v While the 95% threshold for subset TDB given in Table 7 reduces to a mere 3 basis points, an 
expansion of the measure to the entire holding period brings the 95% threshold to about 3pp. 
